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INTRODUCTION 
The drastic increase in incarceration in conjunction with the seri-
ous decrease in institutionalization of mental health patients has led 
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to a significantly higher proportion of incarcerated individuals with 
serious mental health problems.1  As a result, the rates of suicide are 
on the rise in local jails and remain steady in state prisons.2  Deaths by 
suicide as a percentage of total deaths, however, is generally on the 
rise in both prisons and jails3 since the death rate has otherwise been 
in decline.4  Judge Richard Posner has described the suicide rates in 
prison as “frighteningly high.”5  Suicide is the second leading cause of 
death in jail and the third leading cause of death in prison.6  Prisons 
and jails are severely constrained in the breadth and depth of their 
mental health services, thus impeding what would otherwise be ideal 
methods for reducing prisoner suicide.7 
As the issues plaguing our systems of incarceration come under 
increasing scrutiny, the pervasiveness of mental illness and suicide in 
prisons ought to put the treatment of mentally ill and suicidal prison-
ers toward the forefront of institutional evaluation and reform.  The 
recent Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata addressed the mis-
treatment of mentally ill prisoners in the context of prison over-
crowding.8  The issue, however, extends beyond concerns of over-
crowding.  The “harsh and isolated conditions” and “limited mental 
health services” criticized by the Supreme Court are not unique to 
overcrowded prisons.9  Courts, including the Supreme Court, recog-
 
 1 Ildiko Suto & Genevieve L.Y. Arnaut, Suicide in Prison:  A Qualitative Study, 90 THE PRISON 
J. 288, 289 (2010) (“[D]einstitutionalizing mental health patients . . . [has] led to a great-
er proportion of incarcerated individuals with mental health problems, including those at 
risk for suicide.”). 
 2 MARGARET E. NOONAN & SCOTT GINDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 242186, MORALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2001 - 
STATISTICAL TABLES, Tables 2–15 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/mljsp0011.pdf. 
 3 Lindsay M. Hayes, Prison Suicide:  An Overview and a Guide to Prevention, 75 THE PRISON J. 
431, 431 (1995) (“Although the rate of suicide in prisons is far lower than it is in jails, it 
remains disproportionately higher than that for the general population.”). 
 4 NOONAN & GINDER, supra note 2, at Tables 1, 14. 
 5 Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 6 Id. at 980–81; See Anasseril E. Daniel, Preventing Suicide in Prison:  A Collaborative Responsibil-
ity of Administrative, Custodial, and Clinical Staff, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 165, 165 
(2006) (“Suicide is the third leading cause of death in U.S. prisons and the second in 
jails.”). 
 7 OR. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE SUICIDE PREVENTION STUDY 16–17 (2009), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/RESRCH/docs/Inmate_Suicide_Prevention_Study_
Report.pdf. 
 8 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924–25 (2011) (recognizing that overcrowding and 
harsh and isolated conditions have contributed to an inmate suicide rate approaching 
one per week). 
 9 Id. at 1924; see also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (remanding 
case to ascertain “the actual conditions of plaintiff’s confinement and the existence of any 
feasible alternatives”). 
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nize that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment extends to protect inmates “from an environment where 
degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely.”10 
Beyond the moral compunctions, the treatment of suicidal pris-
oners is of particular concern given the rise in lawsuits against prison 
officials11 for failing to prevent inmate suicide.12  In order to preemp-
tively avoid many of these cases, officials have taken measures to 
make prisoner suicide nearly impossible.  These measures are too of-
ten aimed not at providing mental health services, but rather at “pre-
venting the attempt from succeeding.”13  The purpose of tort law, as 
Professor George Keating aptly recognizes, is to incentivize individu-
als to take precautions that are cost-justified,14 not to prevent injury at 
any cost.15  Tort law is intended to strike a balance, but precautions 
that exceed justification defy the logic of tort and encroach on our 
 
 10 Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)). 
 11 Suit may be brought against state and local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or federal 
officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  The same legal standards apply to both Section 1983 and Bivens suits and are 
therefore evaluated jointly throughout this Comment.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 524 
U.S. 61, 81–82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting the Court’s recognition of 
“sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism, as different standards for claims against 
state and federal actors ‘would be incongruous and confusing’” (quoting Butz v. Econo-
mou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978))). 
 12 See, e.g., Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529–30 (7th Cir. 
2000) (outlining both an “objectively serious” risk of “substantial harm” and “deliberate 
indifference” on behalf of the prison official towards the prison inmate as necessary for 
an Eighth Amendment claim); Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“[D]efendants may be liable for [an inmate’s] suicide if they were deliberately indiffer-
ent . . . .”). 
 13 Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 990–91 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Vega v. Davis, 
No. 13-1268, 2014 WL 3585714 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (exemplifying cases in which re-
straints are unsuccessfully used in lieu of mental health services); Easley v. Judd, 1:14-CV-
100, 2014 WL 897166, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2014) report and recommendation adopted, 
1:14CV100, 2014 WL 1660690 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2014) (“[P]laintiff essentially com-
plains about his long-term placement in isolation as a substitute for treatment for his 
mental health issues, which involve depression and suicidal thoughts that have worsened 
over the course of the over-two-year period he has been in isolation.”). 
 14 See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (estab-
lishing a widely adopted algebraic formula for calculating the proper level of precaution); 
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986) (adopting and 
applying a formula to determine that the cost to the public that would result cannot justi-
fy holding manufacturer liable).  This cost-benefit analysis has been applied to many are-
as of tort law, including constitutional tort law, as recognized by the Seventh Circuit.  
Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 981–82 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing “the fa-
mous Hand formula” (citing Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173)). 
 15 George C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
653, 658, 661 (2003) (arguing that fairness warrants extending precaution beyond cost-
justification, but not further). 
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liberty.16  This dichotomy was recently recognized by the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana when a prisoner alleged an Eighth Amendment vio-
lation as a result of being placed on suicide watch.  The Court recog-
nized that the measures taken were reasonable and that “if [the 
Warden] had ignored plaintiff’s actions and he then committed sui-
cide, she might well have been liable for failing to take preventative 
measures.”17 
The risk of suit from inmate suicide and the cost of defending 
against such suits, needless to mention the potential cost of an unfa-
vorable judgment, have led officials to take extraordinary measures in 
physically restraining inmates.18  Rather than resulting in a burgeon-
ing of cases challenging these severe restraints, though, suits have 
continued to charge officials with deliberate indifference despite their 
use of extreme restraints, thus encouraging officials to go even fur-
ther in attempting to prevent suicide.19  Yet just as Professor Keating 
recognized the liberty limit necessary in general tort law,20 there like-
wise needs to be some limit in constitutional tort law, at least insofar as 
the Eighth Amendment is concerned.21  While suicide prevention 
measures are intended to prevent self-harm, whether all physically 
 
 16 Id. at 661 (recognizing that there must be a limit to prevent “inflicting harms to our liber-
ty greater than the harms . . . on our security”). 
 17 Stewart v. Warner, No. 13-4759-DEK, 2014 WL 3498165, at *4 (E.D. La. July 15, 2014). 
 18 See, e.g., Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (7th Cir. 1985) (recounting plaintiff’s 
nine-day period restrained in only underwear to a bed by all four limbs leaving abrasions, 
bruises, and restricting blood flow while also leaving plaintiff with an unemptied urinal 
pitcher provided only at convenience of guards); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-08-3262, 
2009 WL 2151340, at *5 (D. Md. July 10, 2009) (approving the use of five-point restraints 
on prisoner for four hour intervals and, on some occasions, without clothing). 
 19 See, e.g., Beyer ex rel. Estate of Beyer v. Johnson City, No. 2:01-CV-45, 2003 WL 23737298, 
at *1, *4, (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (alleging deliberate indifference to suicide committed in “re-
straint chair” with three body belts, two wrist straps, and two ankle straps). 
 20 Keating, supra note 15, at 658, 661. 
 21 The Supreme Court has already explicitly established the need for balancing costs and 
benefits in similar, related contexts.  For example, in determining whether to extend ab-
solute immunity to an official, an analysis that in many cases occurs as a predicate to de-
ciding the issue of Section 1983 liability, the court must launch a “discerning inquiry into 
whether the contributions of immunity to effective government . . . outweigh the perhaps 
recurring harm to individual citizens.”  Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973); see also 
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 298 (1988) (recognizing the need to balance potential 
costs and benefits under the particular circumstances).  This approach has been further 
expanded to apply in all inquiries regarding official immunity.  Forrester v. White, 484 
U.S. 219, 224 (1988).  Even when immunity is unavailable, as is often rightly the case, tort 
liability in itself likewise requires a balancing act.  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 
321 (1982) (“[W]hether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be 
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”); see also 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (applying balancing tests for First, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendment challenges). 
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possible measures should be taken to prevent self-harm at any cost is 
an issue that has yet to be resolved.22 
This Comment seeks to identify and discuss an issue in our prison 
system partially created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “Section 
1983”) and likewise proposes how Section 1983 may be used to strike 
the proper balance between protection and torment of suicidal pris-
oners.  Part I of this Comment examines the liability faced by prison 
officials for suicides committed by those who are incarcerated23 and 
the effect of such liability on the behavior of prison officials.  Part II 
explains how the heightened risks associated with suicide liability 
identified in Part I lead to suicide prevention measures that are 
aimed at avoiding liability rather than protecting and providing men-
tal health treatment for prisoners.  Part III briefly explains the 
framework for bringing an Eighth Amendment suit under Section 
1983 before further analyzing and explaining the dearth of such suits 
in regards to the aggressive suicide prevention measures addressed in 
 
 22 Cf. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding the use of an 
“L” restraint with knees bent and calves perpendicular to back, upper body immobilized 
with straightjacket, ankles cuffed, hands cuffed, and anklecuffs and handcuffs strapped 
together for nearly three days straight because it only caused “physical discomfort and 
emotional pain” without physical injury). 
 23 Immunity doctrines often prevent Section 1983 claims from proceeding to the true sub-
stance of the constitutional claim itself; however, this Comment focuses on Section 1983 
tort liability once immunity claims have been rejected, and the case has proceeded on the 
merits.  The low standard for extending official immunity—the type of immunity most 
likely to arise in the prison context—means prison officials are often shielded from de-
fending against the constitutional tort claim itself.  See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3573.3 (3d ed. 2008) 
(“[Q]ualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 349 (1986))); see also Wilson v. 
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (applying identical qualified immunity analyses to Sec-
tion 1983 and Bivens).  This can create gaps in case law because the Supreme Court no 
longer requires courts to first decide the merits of the constitutional claim.  In a recent 
Supreme Court decision, the Court made discretionary the formerly mandatory two-step 
analysis of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), which required courts to first decide the 
merits of the constitutional claim before hearing and deciding a claim of immunity.  
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (finding the Saucier framework no longer 
mandatory, but rather subject to the discretion of lower federal court judges).  As a result, 
federal courts are now permitted to first resolve an official’s claim of immunity and there-
fore potentially avoid deciding the merits of a plaintiff’s constitutional claim.  Pearson, 555 
U.S. at 236; see also Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (recognizing that the 
Pearson approach “comports with [the Court’s] usual reluctance to decide constitutional 
questions unnecessarily”).  Despite the plethora of issues raised by the problems of im-
munity, since the doctrine does not specifically affect the courts’ execution of the stand-
ards for finding tort liability upon reaching the merits of the constitutional tort claim, it 
has no affect on the lack of balancing at issue here. 
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Part II.24  Finally, Part IV discusses implications of the current state of 
our case law on mental health treatment services in prisons and pos-
sible resolutions. 
I.  SUICIDE LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983 
Inmate suicide is a serious issue in incarceration facilities 
throughout the United States.  When a prisoner commits suicide 
while incarcerated, the estate will often bring a Section 1983 action 
against the prison officials or, in the case of jails, perhaps even 
against the city itself.25  Federal district courts and circuit courts of 
appeal do not resolve Section 1983 suits brought by the estates of de-
ceased prisoners against prison officials uniformly.  Looking at a 
cross-section of these cases provides a basis for understanding the 
challenges and risk of liability faced by prison officials.  The risk to 
prison officials posed by suicide liability suits has led to a serious esca-
lation in the level of suicide precaution exercised in prisons.26 
A.  Establishing Liability for Prisoner Suicide 
To succeed in a survivorship action against prison officials alleging 
a failure to protect, the plaintiff’s estate must meet both the objective 
and subjective components of the test for deliberate indifference as 
laid out in Farmer v. Brennan.27  The objective component requires the 
 
 24 Actions against federal, state, and local officials are analyzed uniformly throughout this 
Comment because the same substantive legal standard applies to each action.  While a 
more rigorous standard applies to a Bivens action in certain new contexts, which likely re-
duces the number and success of suits against federal officials under federal law, because 
this only applies to limit suits permitted to go forward and not the standard for liability 
applied, it will have no effect in the ultimate finding of liability relevant here.  See Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980) (delineating situations where a Bivens action may be 
defeated); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (refusing to apply a Bivens rem-
edy for alleged Eighth Amendment violation). 
 25 Suits brought against a municipality are more challenging to prove, and therefore less 
frequent, as Section 1983 suits brought against municipalities require showing that the 
municipality has an official policy or custom that caused the deprivation of rights.  Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).  Even in particularly egre-
gious cases where the liability of the municipality is clear, the prohibition on punitive 
damages for municipal liability further limits the ultimate success of municipal liability 
claims.  See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[W]e hold that a 
municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
 26 In addition to the well-known risk of defending against a lawsuit, there is also the risk of 
adverse publicity.  See Hayes, supra note 3, at 431–32 (1995) (documenting resulting pub-
licity following prison suicides). 
 27 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (relying on precedent to establish requirements for proof of 
objective seriousness and subjective culpability). 
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plaintiff to prove that the alleged deprivation is objectively “sufficient-
ly serious.”28  The subjective component enforces the principle estab-
lished in Wilson v. Seiter that “only the unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.”29  The defendant-
prison official must have a requisite mental state beyond mere negli-
gence – the defendant must be “deliberately indifferent” to the 
health or safety of the inmate.30  The Court reads the Eighth 
Amendment as requiring this subjective component because the 
Amendment does not prohibit “cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it 
outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”31 
1.  The Objective Prong 
In suits alleging a failure to protect an inmate from suicide, the 
objective component involves a straightforward inquiry as to whether 
there was a sufficiently serious risk of suicide.32  The objective com-
ponent hinges on whether there is a medical need so obvious that a 
layperson would recognize the need for medical attention.33  If the 
prisoner succeeds in committing suicide, however, this prong is nec-
essarily met.34  In many circuits, deliberate indifference to an inmate’s 
psychological needs violates the inmate’s constitutional rights just as 
much as disregard to physical needs.35  For such an allegation to rise 
to the level of “sufficiently serious” there must be “neglect of ‘serious’ 
medical needs,” because there is no expectation in society that pris-
oners will have unqualified health care access.36  It is recognized that 
suicidal tendencies constitute a serious medical need.37  In addition to 
demonstrating neglect of the inmate’s serious medical needs, subjec-
 
 28 Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 
 29 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 
 30 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (“[T]he official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety.”). 
 31 Id. at 837. 
 32 See Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[D]eliberate in-
difference has become the barometer by which suicide cases . . . are tested.”). 
 33 Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 
F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)). 
 34 See, e.g., Gaston v. Ploeger, 297 F. App’x 738, 742 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that the objec-
tive component is “[o]bviously” satisfied by suicide); Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 
(7th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming prior cases establishing that “the objective element is met by 
virtue of the suicide itself”). 
 35 Blackmon, 734 F.3d at 1245 (citing Ramos, 639 F.2d at 574–75). 
 36 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 
(1976)). 
 37 Schultz v. Sillman, 148 F. App’x 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[S]uicidal tendencies consti-
tute a serious medical need.”). 
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tively there must be deliberate indifference on the part of the de-
fendant. 
2.  The Subjective Prong 
The subjective prong of the Farmer test is far more difficult to 
prove and is often fatal to the claim.  The prison official must actually 
know of the inhumane nature of the plaintiff’s confinement, yet deny 
or delay medical care.38  Because deliberate indifference is not estab-
lished by mere negligence, the subjective prong imposes a more 
stringent standard than most tort law.  Rather, the Supreme Court 
has established a standard akin to criminal recklessness where a de-
fendant is liable for consciously disregarding a substantial risk of seri-
ous harm.39  The standard is more stringent than mere negligence, 
but does not go so far as to require an actual intent to harm.40  In 
Mitchell, the defendant-officer explicitly ordered Mr. Mitchell 
stripped naked in a concrete cell without heat, bedding, glasses, ex-
ercise, writing utensils, adequate ventilation, hot water, and limited 
toilet paper.41  The alleged deprivations caused by the officer’s orders 
were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find deliberate indifference.42  
In many cases, however, there is far more limited information availa-
ble to infer deliberate indifference.43  But the court will often investi-
gate whether the inmate showed a strong likelihood that he would at-
tempt suicide to an extent that the officer must have strongly 
suspected the risk.44  As a result, an officer may be liable even without 
having explicit knowledge of the risk of suicide.45 
 
 38 Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–06). 
 39 Mata, 427 F.3d at 752. 
 40 Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Deliberate indifference does 
not require a finding of express intent to harm.” (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 
319 (1986))). 
 41 Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1442.  
 42 Id. 
 43 Cf. Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 924 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1991) (requiring evi-
dentiary proof of deliberate indifference outside suicide itself).  The difficulties of proof 
both for prisoners and prison officials may subside in the near future as video recording 
technology becomes increasingly accessible and affordable.  See, e.g., Jacoby v. Mack, No. 
12-0366-CG-C, 2014 WL 2435655, at *15 (S.D. Ala. May 30, 2014) (“Subsequent to . . . 
Plaintiff’s alleged May 23, 2012 assault, another guard and extra cameras were placed in 
the unit.”); O’Connor v. Kelley, No. 3:10CV360/LAC/EMT, 2014 WL 1133522, at *2 
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2014) (noting that a prison official “arrived at the location and began 
operating a portable video/audio recording camera”); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-08-
3262, 2009 WL 2151340, at *2 (D. Md. July 10, 2009) (“[R]estraint cells are monitored by 
cameras[.]”). 
 44 Schultz v. Sillman, 148 F. App’x 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 
630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996) (“It is enough for Haley to show that the defendants actually 
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B.  Additional Risks in Suits Alleging Liability for Prisoner Suicide 
There are three serious concerns that make suicide liability suits 
particularly risky for prison officials.  These risks arise as a result of 
fewer concerns at trial in suicide liability cases. The first concern is 
the cost of discovery, and of potentially defending, that arises based 
on the difficulty of proving a subjective state of mind without exten-
sive inquiry.  Since these claims often require probing factual investi-
gation, summary judgment is less likely to occur early in the litiga-
tion, and perhaps may not occur at all.  Secondly, prison officials are 
often accorded high levels of deference in prison administration 
challenges, but since suicides often occur outside the usual context of 
maintaining order in the prison, there is less deference and therefore 
a higher chance of liability.  While deference usually imposes another 
obstacle in Eighth Amendment claims, that obstacle is removed, or at 
least reduced, in the context of prisoner suicide.  Finally, the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act was specifically enacted to reduce the number 
of suits brought by prisoners against officials.  While the Act specifi-
cally creates heightened requirements for suit, the PLRA is inappli-
cable when the prisoner has committed suicide and is thus no longer 
incarcerated.  These three concerns in combination make suicide li-
ability cases more likely to proceed further into litigation and there-
fore incentivize prison officials to go above and beyond in avoiding 
such claims. 
1.  Cost of Defending Beyond Summary Judgment 
Even when prison officials perfectly execute all reasonable preven-
tion measures, prisoners determined to commit suicide may still suc-
ceed.46  Oftentimes, such suicides then become the basis of suits 
against prison officials.  The cost of defending against such suits, even 
when they do not proceed past the summary judgment stage, deters 
prison officials who would otherwise refrain from taking suicide pre-
cautions that crossed over the bounds of reasonableness.47  Since the 
 
knew of a substantial risk that Wilborn would seriously harm him.” (emphasis omitted)); 
Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345–46 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he inmate must show that he is 
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”). 
 45 See Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing objective indica-
tions of suicide, although generally difficult to predict). 
 46 See, e.g., Beyer ex rel. Estate of Beyer v. Johnson City, No. 2:01-CV-45, 2003 WL 23737298, 
at *4, (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003) (alleging deliberate indifference to suicide committed 
in “restraint chair” with three body belts, two wrist straps, and two ankle straps). 
 47 Before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),  
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the costs of discovery, particularly in civil rights 
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subjective prong is inordinately fact-specific due to the inherent diffi-
culty in ascertaining an official’s state of mind, deliberate indiffer-
ence claims necessarily require particularly invasive discovery.48  Fur-
thermore, since fee shifting is not symmetrical under 42 U.S.C. § 
1988(b), defendants are unlikely49 to recoup the cost of the suit even 
if it fails.50 
 
suits, were widely examined and discussed.  See, e.g., Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  The Supreme Court Takes A 
Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli-
gence & Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1085, 1100–01 (1994) (“A § 1983 plaintiff 
sometimes must engage in a great deal of costly and disruptive discovery to substantiate a 
claim.”); Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign:  Why Courts Should 
Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 267, 269, 284 (2002) (“Consistent with its exercise of judicial restraint, the Crawford-El 
Court declined the invitation to revise established rules and employ a blunt instrument 
that inflicts a high cost on plaintiffs with bona fide constitutional claims.”).  Since the ad-
vent of the heightened pleading standard and its application to civil rights claims in 2009, 
this discussion has largely abated, but the issue remains.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  See, e.g., 
Stephen R. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading:  Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plau-
sibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2010) (“In 2009, the Supreme Court’s Ash-
croft v. Iqbal opinion confirmed that Twombly articulated a general standard of pleading 
that applied outside of the antitrust context.”); Morgan Smith, On Notice:  The Supreme 
Court’s Recent Decisions Regarding Heightened Pleading Requirements Leave Much to Be Desired, 
10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 47, 56 n.98 (2010) (“Even though the Supreme Court originally en-
dorsed notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson, courts have since embraced heightened plead-
ings in many contexts.”). 
 48 See Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 924 F.2d 794, 795–98 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing 
that “the concept behind the controlling law is simple, [but] application . . . necessarily 
depends on the facts of a given case”); see also Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 
1111, 1114–15 (3d Cir. 1988) (permitting discovery that allows plaintiff the opportunity 
to prove case). 
 49 While unlikely, it is not impossible for defendants to recover costs, since Rule 11 may also 
provide for fees in cases involving sanctionable conduct.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  A defendant 
may also receive post-offer costs, but not fees, through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 
(hereinafter “Rule 68”).  FED. R. CIV. P. 68; see Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333 
(1st Cir. 1986) (“[P]laintiff who refuses an offer of judgment, and later fails to obtain a 
more favorable judgment, must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs.”); see also Pouillon v. 
Little, 326 F.3d 713, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 68 . . . requires that an offer made 
pursuant to the rule be compared to the judgment ‘finally obtained.’”); Tunison v. Cont’l 
Airlines Corp., 162 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]nterpreting Rule 68 to re-
quire payment of a defendant’s costs where the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less 
favorable than an earlier offer . . . is entirely consistent with Rule 68’s purpose . . . .”); 
O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989) (“We hold that a 
plaintiff who refuses an offer of judgment under Rule 68 and later fails to receive a more 
favorable judgment must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs.”); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 691 F.2d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[W]here a Rule 
68 offer is made and the judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff is not more favorable 
than the offer, he must pay the costs incurred after the asking of the offer.”). 
 50 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000). 
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Finally, the unpredictable nature of judge and jury determinations 
as to deliberate indifference51 adds further cost to litigation by reduc-
ing clarity in deciding when to settle.  Unpredictability in assessing 
the outcome of cases may lead officials to unnecessarily decide to set-
tle or litigate.52  Unpredictability in assessing outcomes in the form of 
monetary verdicts may also hinder the ability of officials to effectively 
use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (hereinafter “Rule 68”) when 
making settlement offers,53 since Rule 68 only allows defendants to 
escape paying a prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys fees and costs when 
the offer made was higher than the judgment ultimately collected by 
the plaintiff.54 
2.  Deference to Prison Officials 
The second issue arises from the lower level of deference afforded 
in a majority of suicide cases.  Unlike in cases in which officers must 
use force to restore order in emergency situations and thus act out of 
urgent necessity, which earns the officers a great deal of deference 
from the courts,55 suicide liability cases are often not made in the con-
text of split-second decisions that require extensive discretion.56  Pris-
on officials outside the context of emergency situations do not re-
ceive the reduced standard of “good faith effort,” and therefore 
 
 51 See Christy P. Johnson, Mental Health Care Policies in Jail Systems:  Suicide and the Eighth 
Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1243–47 (2002) (comparing Estate of Cills v. Kaf-
tan, 105 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.J. 2000), with Estate of Novack v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 
525 (7th Cir. 2000), as demonstrative of this inconsistency). 
 52 See generally Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68:  Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settle-
ment Rule by Injecting Certainty into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 916 (2007) 
(“[I]nstead of litigants ‘evaluat[ing] the risk and costs of litigation’ as intended by the 
rule, litigants end up evaluating the risks and costs of Rule 68.”); Lesley S. Bonney et. al, 
Rule 68:  Awakening A Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 379, 379 (1997) (“Litigants 
and counsel find it extraordinarily difficult to make informed decisions on the merits of 
making or accepting an offer of judgment under Rule 68.”). 
 53 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, Of Offers Not (Frequently) Made and (Rarely) Ac-
cepted:  The Mystery of Federal Rule 68, 57 MERCER L. REV. 723, 733–34 (2006) (detailing 
multiple reasons for the underutilization of Rule 68). 
 54 FED R. CIV. P. 68; see, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (finding petitioners 
not obligated to pay costs, including attorney fees, incurred after settlement offer). 
 55 See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (distinguishing cases where prison 
security measures are undertaken to resolve a disturbance (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 
F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973))). 
 56 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321–22 (finding that prison security, which is ordinarily left to the 
discretion of prison officials, is afforded even more deference in the face of actual con-
flict or unrest) citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish 
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979))). 
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liability is more likely to result in cases involving the suicide of an in-
mate.57 
This is not to suggest, however, that deference is lacking.58  In fact, 
the Supreme Court jurisprudence is highly deferential to prison ad-
ministrators.59  It remains unclear whether this level of deference is 
appropriate when prisoners challenge conditions of confinement 
under the Eighth Amendment.60  As a result, the level of deference 
varies with the jurisdiction and the particular court’s standard of def-
erence.61  An unclear standard of deference adds to the uncertainty of 
Eighth Amendment cases and likely leads prison officials to err on 
the side of caution in terms of reducing liability, thus providing fur-
ther reason for officials to employ extensive suicide precautions.62 
3.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 
Finally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act,63 which is aimed at re-
ducing claims asserted by prisoners,64 does not apply to causes of ac-
 
 57 See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (setting a standard for correctional officers applying force in 
good faith, rather than maliciously and sadistically to cause harm). 
 58 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (creating a laundry list of 
reasons for exceptional deference to prison authorities). 
 59 Bell, 441 U.S. at 547–48 (“Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their 
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institu-
tional security.”). 
 60 See Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of Supermax 
Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1522–23 (2004) (“[S]ome federal courts play an active 
role in extending the Court’s deferential policies.”).  The inconsistency in deference may 
be seen by comparing Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992) and Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764, 769 
(6th Cir. 1988) with Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1124–25 (W.D. Wis. 2001),  
which recognizes that defendants are afforded deference, but finds for prisoners none-
theless. 
 61 See Weidman, supra note 60, at 1521–23 (delineating the circuit split in applying Turner 
deference). 
 62 See Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard:  Incorporating Interna-
tional Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in 
United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71, 101 (2000) (“Turner’s broad language left 
uncertainty as to whether the Court intended the rational basis standard to apply to 
Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 63 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West  2013) (outlining the conditions under which prisoners 
may bring suit and the limitations on such suits). 
 64 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–94 (2006) (“The PLRA attempts to eliminate unwar-
ranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons . . . .  The PLRA also 
was intended to ‘reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.’” (quoting 
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002))). 
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tion brought by a deceased prisoner’s estate.65  Ordinarily, under the 
PLRA, prisoners must exhaust all administrative remedies that are 
available regardless of whether they provide the relief demanded.66  
An estate bringing suit does not encounter this barrier since the 
PLRA only applies to currently incarcerated prisoners, nor must it 
comply with the filing fee and physical injury requirements.67  Com-
plaints against prison officials alleging liability for suicide are there-
fore much more likely than ordinary Eighth Amendment cases to re-
quire extensive litigation.68 
The probing discovery, reduced likelihood of summary judgment, 
difficulties in assessing settlement, an unclear standard of deference, 
and the lack of PLRA protection likely influence prison officials to 
take such extensive measures in an attempt to prevent prisoner sui-
cide.  Even though these cases are not necessarily more likely to suc-
ceed, the risk inherent in proceeding through discovery and litiga-
tion is enough to lead prison officials to take extraordinary measures.  
Part II will evaluate these measures, their efficacy in preventing sui-
cide, and their effects on the mental state of suicidal prisoners.  Then 
Part III will discuss how the Eighth Amendment, through Section 
1983 suits, should deter prison officials from such precautions that 
reach too far. 
 
 65 The scope of the PLRA applies only to prisoners and the Act defines “prisoner” in such a 
manner as to not extend to the estate of deceased prisoners.  John Boston, The Prison Liti-
gation Reform Act, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY PRISONER’S RIGHTS PROJECT PRO BONO 
TRAINING, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1-5, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
Boston_PLRA_Treatise.pdf (analyzing case law to establish the definition of “prisoner” 
under the PLRA, which generally is limited to only currently confined persons); 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(3) (West 1997) (defining “prisoner” as “any person subject to incar-
ceration, detention, or admission to any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced 
for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law”). 
 66 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001) (holding that prisoners must exhaust the 
prison administrative process if it “could provide some sort of relief on the complaint 
stated”). 
 67 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1915(b)(1), (g) (West 1996) (requiring filling fees to be paid in full with a 
limited exception and imposing a three strikes limit to reduced filing fees); 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1997e(e) (West 2013) (eliminating suits for mental and emotional injury unless accom-
panied by physical injury). 
 68 The PLRA provides barriers to nearly all civil suits brought by prisoners against prison 
officials in accordance with the intent of Congress to discourage and reduce prison litiga-
tion; removing such a limitation therefore significantly opens opportunity for litigation.  
See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (applying the PLRA to “all inmate suits 
about prison life”). 
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II.  SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES 
Many national, state, and local entities are taking measures to 
combat the high suicide rate plaguing our jails and prisons.69  Offi-
cials have not been left alone in the endeavor, and various task forces 
and researchers have taken up the issue of predicting and preventing 
suicide.70  There is no doubt that our treatment of mentally ill prison-
ers has improved over the course of time; however, as the mentally ill 
prison population continues to increase, the methods for handling 
suicidal prisoners becomes of increasing import.71 
Many of the most important suicide prevention standards have 
been developed and implemented in an effort to avoid liability.72  
Prisons generally respond to suicidal prisoners by imposing re-
strictions that make it nearly impossible for the prisoner to commit 
suicide.73  Such measures range from placing the inmate in adminis-
trative segregation with heightened supervision to prisoners being 
stripped naked and restrained to a chair.  Prison officials, who tend 
 
 69 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVICES:  GUIDELINES TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 1–8 (2004 ed.), 
available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf  (examining 
“in detail correctional health care programs and suggest[ing] guidelines that contain 
mechanisms for program implementation”); OR. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 7, at 
16–17 (summarizing statistics on the occurrence of inmate suicides in prisons); Judith F. 
Cox & Pamela C. Morschauser, A Solution to the Problem of Jail Suicide, 18 CRISIS 178, 178–
184 (1997) .  The single largest contributor to the study and treatment of suicidal prison-
ers for the last three decades has been Lindsay Hayes at the National Center for Institu-
tions and Alternatives.  See Ronald L. Bonner, Correctional Suicide Prevention in the Year 2000 
and Beyond, 30 SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 370, 370–71 (2000) (providing 
an overview of Hayes’ contributions). 
 70 Nobert Konrad et. al, Preventing Suicide in Prisons, Part I:  Recommendations from the Interna-
tional Association for Suicide Prevention Task Force on Suicide in Prisons, 28 CRISIS 113–121 
(2007). 
 71 Jacques Baillargeon et. al, Psychiatric Disorders and Suicide in the Nation’s Largest State Prison 
System, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 188, 188 (2009) (recognizing suicide as one of 
leading causes of death due to half of the prison population being mentally ill and then 
subjected to “psychological stressors” in the correctional setting). 
 72 See Bonner, supra note 69, at 371 (2000) (“Based on . . . increasing litigation involving jail 
and prison suicides, several major suicide prevention standards have been developed.”); 
Anasseril E. Daniel, Preventing Suicide in Prison:  A Collaborative Responsibility of Administra-
tive, Custodial, and Clinical Staff, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 165, 173 (2006), available at 
http://www.jaapl.org/content/34/2/165.full.pdf+html (“The program described 
is . . . to avoid any malpractice or deliberate-indifference claims”). 
 73 Precautions that strive for impossibility tend to be employed as default measures to abate 
suicide risk, but are unlikely to be effective or productive.  See Jay S. Albanese, Preventing 
Inmate Suicides, 47 FED. PROBATION 65, 68 (1983) (advancing the claim that locking an 
inmate in a room with all dangerous instruments removed is not supported by research); 
Hayes, supra note 3, at 431, 434 (citing a thirteen-year period where 79% of suicides in 
Kentucky prisons occurred in special housing units). 
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to select suicide prevention methods most convenient to the staff ra-
ther than require extensive observation and treatment, will often 
physically isolate or even restrain the individual.74  The literature, 
however, recognizes that inmates should only be stripped naked and 
physically restrained as an absolute last resort.75  Furthermore, isola-
tion and deprivation of human contact are also disfavored; housing 
assignments are more effective in protecting inmates when based on 
interaction and observation of the inmate.76  The scientifically sup-
ported policies to ensure proper care and prevention include “(1) su-
icide assessment, observation, and intervention; (2) psychotropic 
medication use; (3) involuntary/forced medication and involuntary 
medical treatment; and (4) inpatient hospitalization of the mentally 
ill.”77  Despite research and common-sense counseling against ex-
treme isolation,78 sensory deprivation, and the extensive use of re-
straints, most suicide precautions employed in jail and prison settings 
utilize such methods.79 
Perhaps one of the most commonly used (or abused)80 measures is 
administrative segregation, wherein the inmate is removed from the 
 
 74 LINDSAY M. HAYES, NAT’L CTR. ON INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, SUICIDE PREVENTION 
IN CUSTODY:  GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS 
WITHIN JAILS AND PRISONS (2011), available at http://www.ncianet.org/services/suicide-
prevention-in-custody/publications/guide-to-developing-and-revising-suicide-prevention-
protocols-within-jails-and-prisons. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Id. at n.11 (2011) (explaining that precautions that appear punitive create reluctance 
in inmates who are suicidal to seek mental health services or admit to suicidal thoughts).  
This is further bolstered by evidence demonstrating that sixty percent of inmates may 
“communicate their intent to kill themselves either verbally or nonverbally,” thus creating 
a very real reason not to dissuade such communication.  Daniel, supra note 72, at 171. 
 77 Daniel, supra note 72, at 169. 
 78 See generally Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 115, 116 (2008) (“[C]onditions of prolonged solitary have long been known to 
cause serious mental harm.”). 
 79 A cross section of recent cases from multiple jurisdictions demonstrate the prevalence of 
restraints and isolation in prisons and jails across the country.  See, e.g., Vega v. Davis, No. 
13-1268, 2014 WL 3585714 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (discussing the use of restraints); 
Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the use of 
isolation); McCreary v. Governor of Virginia, No. 3:12CV484-HEH, 2014 WL 4162202, at 
n.12 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2014) (asserting the authority for the use of restraints); Easley v. 
Judd, 1:14-CV-100, 2014 WL 897166 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2014) report and recommendation 
adopted, 1:14CV100, 2014 WL 1660690 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2014) (discussing the use of 
isolation); Gay v. Chandra, 652 F. Supp. 2d 959, 967 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (discussing the use of 
restraints); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-08-3262, 2009 WL 2151340 (D. Md. July 10, 
2009) (discussing the use of restraints). 
 80 See Bonner, supra note 69, at 374 (“Perhaps no factor has been more tragically associated 
with jail and prison suicides than the consistent finding of isolated/segregated housing of 
the jail or prison environment.” (citing Ronald L. Bonner, Isolation, Seclusion, and Psycho-
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general population and placed in an isolated cell.  A prisoner in 
North Carolina brought suit to challenge the conditions of his con-
finement; he was kept in a small, concrete cell, was provided extreme-
ly minimal contact with others, and could not participate in activities 
or go outdoors for several years.81  During that time, and despite 
those restrictions, Mr. Williams was still occasionally placed in re-
straints while in a concrete cell alone for four-hour periods.82  The 
Fourth Circuit, however, upheld dismissal of the claim arguing that to 
the extent the isolation and behavioral restrictions aggravated plain-
tiff’s mental illness, it was merely “an unfortunate but inevitable result 
of his incarceration.”83  The court concluded that, based on the re-
sponsibility of prison officials to limit self-harm, there was not a suffi-
cient deprivation.84 
There are certainly cases in which courts, even within the same ju-
risdiction, reach the opposite result.  A prisoner in Virginia, Mr. Mil-
ton McCray, was confined in a “mental observation” cell where he was 
stripped naked and confined to a room without a blanket, a mattress, 
a sink, running water, or hygienic tools.85  Despite an initial dismissal 
by the district court,86 the circuit court found that the conditions ab-
solutely presented an issue triable by a jury.87  The Fourth Circuit held 
that, even if such conditions were to be permissible, the failure of the 
official “to devise and employ means to protect McCray from injury to 
himself other than continued isolation with deprivation of clothing 
and elements of personal hygiene,” was not permissible.88  While this 
is the intuitive result, when contrasted with the Fourth Circuit deci-
sion in Williams, such results are anything but predictable.89 
Although courts have routinely upheld the use of segregation and 
isolation,90 the field of psychology recognizes that “such archaic prac-
 
social Vulnerability as Risk Factors for Suicide Behind Bars, in ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION OF 
SUICIDE, 398–419 (Ronald W. Maris et. al eds., 1992))). 
 81 Williams v. Branker, 462 F. App’x 348, 350–51 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 354. 
 84 Id. 
 85 McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1975) (describing conditions of confine-
ment in the mental observation cell). 
 86 Id. at 360 (“[The district court] found that no constitutional violations had occurred in 
the incidents alleged.”). 
 87 Id. at 369 (“[We] cannot conceive that decent society would tolerate it even for a suspect-
ed mental patient who had been convicted of a crime.”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Williams v. Branker, 462 F. App’x 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 90 While a majority of courts do not consider indefinite administrative segregation to violate 
the Eighth Amendment, there have been notable exceptions where inmates were left in 
segregation without any mental health care.  Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1245 
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tices” must be reevaluated in order for our society make serious pro-
gress in preventing prisoner suicide.91  Alternatives exist.  Cells can be 
designed to significantly reduce the risk of hanging by using air vents 
with holes too small to thread a sheet through, break-away shower 
heads, and concrete slab-secured mattresses.92  Such designs are par-
ticularly effective when paired with human supervision.93 
Notably missing from the literature on effective and productive 
suicide prevention measures is the use of restraints.94  Juries have held 
prison officials liable even when they took all reasonable precau-
tions,95 thus encouraging officials to take extreme measures such as 
full restraints.96  But of graver concern is the result of using restraints. 
Mr. Wells, a prisoner in an Illinois correctional center thought to 
be suicidal, exemplifies the concerns inherent in the restraint prac-
tices.97  Mr. Wells was placed in a four-point shackle wherein each 
limb was shackled to one corner of the bed.98  Mr. Wells remained 
shackled to the bed for nine days.99  The shackles were not gentle; 
there were abrasion and bruises resulting from restricted blood 
 
(10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing concerns stemming from use of restraints without provid-
ing mental health treatment); see e.g., Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1553 (D. Ariz. 
1993) (restricting the use of segregation as an alternative to mental health care).   
 91 Bonner, supra note 69, at 370–71 (arguing that serious mental health care and suicide 
prevention advancements require alternatives to archaic isolation practices). 
 92 See Daniel, supra note 72, at 170 (explaining methods of planning cell design to reduce 
suicide risk). 
 93 Id. at 170–71 (concluding that cell design methods are imperfect, but when paired with 
human supervision provide a deterrent to suicide). 
 94 See Hayes, supra note 3, at 431, 446 (detailing effective suicide prevention policies as those 
with six critical components:  “staff training, intake screening/assessment, housing, levels 
of supervision, intervention, and administrative review”). 
 95 See e.g., Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 924 F.2d 794, 796–97 (8th Cir. 1991) (over-
turning jury verdict for prisoner whose estate argued he should have been fully restrained 
because “the question is not whether the jailers did all they could have, but whether they 
did all the Constitution requires”). 
 96 See Vega v. Davis, No. 13-1268, 2014 WL 3585714 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (recognizing 
the cruelty of placing an emaciated, largely incoherent prisoner in a cell utterly alone 
without mental health care and chained hand and foot); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-08-
3262, 2009 WL 2151340, at *5 (D. Md. July 10, 2009) (granting summary judgment in fa-
vor of defendants where prisoner, on multiple occasions, was stripped of clothing, placed 
in a “suicide smock,” and restrained using a five point system at his wrists, ankles, and tor-
so, because he was monitored in fifteen minute intervals); Ferola v. Moran, 622 F. Supp. 
814, 820 (D.R.I. 1985) (granting prisoner relief after being shackled in a “spread eagle” 
position for twenty hours with no toilet access for fourteen of those hours, thus forcing 
him to lay in his urine and causing permanent nerve damage to his arm). 
 97 Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 98 Id. at 1260–61 (detailing the conditions under which plaintiff was kept). 
 99 Id. at 1260 (“After four days, plaintiff was interviewed briefly by a psychiatrist and, alt-
hough he denied ever expressing suicidal intentions, remained tied down for another five 
days.”). 
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flow.100  Mr. Wells had limited access to water, limited access to a uri-
nal pitcher that required help of the guards and was rarely emptied, 
was itchy, ill, covered in a rash, and was not permitted to shower for 
the entire nine day period.101  The district court dismissed Mr. Wells’ 
claims on a motion for summary judgment,102 deciding that there was 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the officials were 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law without ever reaching a ju-
ry.103  The disturbing aspects of Mr. Wells’ confinement demonstrates 
how the use of restraints may disturb common notions of decency 
and the Seventh Circuit recognized the potentially “unconscionable 
conditions of restraints”104 before reversing and remanding to the 
lower court.105 
 While Mr. Wells being shackled for nine days is an extraordinary 
case, the district court was still unwilling to protect Mr. Wells’ 
rights.106  This unreasonable level of deference further exemplifies 
the barriers faced by suits challenging allegedly unconstitutional use 
of restraints.  And, as in isolation cases, the likelihood of success is 
equally uncertain.  In a 1974 opinion that continues to stand as good 
law today, the Fifth Circuit chastised Alabama prisons for, along with 
a host of serious defects in their mental health programs, not putting 
inmates in lockup cells equipped with restraints.107  Such conflicting 
views espoused by courts add to a lack of clarity already pervasive in 
this area of law. 
III.  SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES AND SECTION 1983 
There are three methods by which a prisoner may challenge ac-
tions taken by prison officials under the Eighth Amendment, but 
each challenge must meet the aforementioned objective and subjec-
 
100 Id. at 1261 (noting that “restraints were carelessly applied, causing abrasions and bruises 
and restricting blood flow to his limbs”). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1260. 
103 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”). 
104 Wells, 777 F.2d at 1264 (citing McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1975)). 
105 Wells, 777 F.2d at 1264–65 (“In light of the eighth amendment precedents . . . conditions 
of his restraint are sufficient to warrant further examination.”). 
106 Id. at 1265. 
107 Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 948 (1975) 
(criticizing the practice of housing mentally unwell prisoners with general population 
and, if eventually removed, put in “lockup cells not equipped with restraints”). 
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tive prongs of the Farmer test to succeed.108  The three challenges are 
those contesting: conditions of confinement, excessive use of force, 
and deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the pris-
oner.109 
Even though both prongs of the Farmer test must be met in each 
case, the applicable standards vary.  To challenge the conditions of 
confinement, the prisoner must show that there are “extreme depri-
vations” since mere discomfort is considered part of the punishment 
itself.110  Extreme deprivations are only those so grave as to deny “the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”111 and are proven by 
showing that an official was “deliberately indifferent to a risk of seri-
ous harm to the plaintiff inmate.”112  An excessive-force claim requires 
the defendant to prove that the force was applied “maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” rather than applied 
in a good faith effort to diffuse an emergency.113 
Lastly, in addition to an objectively serious medical need, cases al-
leging inadequate medical attention require the prison to prove that 
the official’s state of mind must reach the level of “deliberate indif-
ference.”114  The psychological needs of suicidal inmates constitute a 
serious medical need for which liability may attach.115  Such liability, 
however, is limited to circumstances in which prison officials know of 
the need for more mental health care, but are nonetheless deliberately 
indifferent to the medical needs of the prisoners.116  Ultimately, since 
conditions-of-confinement and deprivation of medical care challeng-
es are the claims available to a suicidal inmate,117 the success of such 
suits will necessarily depend on establishing deliberate indifference. 
 
108 See supra Part I.A. 
109 Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2010). 
110 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992) (“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to 
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 
347 (1981))). 
111 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
112 Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,  828 (1994)). 
113 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 
1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). 
114 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976))). 
115 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–06 (“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or in-
jury states a cause of action under § 1983.”). 
116 See Townsend v. City of Morehead, 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000) (establishing knowledge 
as essential to a finding of deliberate indifference). 
117 Excessive force is excluded from the analysis since the suicide prevention methods em-
ployed are highly unlikely to be used “maliciously and sadistically” as is required by such a 
standard.  See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (noting that the intent of the 
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Although there is limited research evaluating the effect of severe 
suicide prevention measures, many observers continue to research 
and argue that we are not doing enough to combat inmate suicide.118  
The American Correctional Association first began promulgating ac-
creditation standards that recommend policies and procedures for 
addressing suicidal detainees in 1981.119  The National Commission 
on Correctional Health Care has supplemented these recommenda-
tions with practical guidelines intended to improve suicide preven-
tion programs and reduce the “risk of adverse legal judgments.”120  
Nonetheless, even as recently as 2005, the majority of facilities had yet 
to adopt and enact successful suicide prevention programs, and re-
searchers argued that it would take many more years of lawsuits for 
proper guidelines to be finally implemented.121 
I do not disagree.  It seems that while many facilities have not 
gone far enough to properly treat suicidal prisoners, many others have 
gone too far to improperly isolate, restrain, and neglect suicidal pris-
oners.  Hence, Part IV argues for a balance.  We do need tort law to 
impose suicide liability to properly incentivize prison officials to aid 
the mentally ill and take precautions to prevent suicide.  But we also 
need tort law to impose liability for indefinitely segregating and ex-
tensively restraining prisoners for a mental condition often outside 
their control.  This is not outside the realm of possibility.  Tort law is 
designed to achieve socially optimal behavior by imposing civil liabil-
ity for unreasonable conduct.122  Section 1983 can lead officials to that 
balance. 
Section 1983 suits seeking to enjoin the use of allegedly unconsti-
tutional isolation, and restraint procedures are more difficult to bring 
than suits brought by an estate after an inmate has committed sui-
cide.  There are two readily identifiable reasons for this difference. 
 
Eighth Amendment is to prohibit barbarous punishment and torture); see, e.g., Rice ex rel. 
Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing an excessive force 
claim brought after an inmate was restrained to a chair for an eighteen-hour period). 
118 See e.g., Schnavia Smith Hatcher, Deliberate Indifference in Jail Suicide Litigation:  A Fatal Judi-
cial Loophole, 24 SOC. WORK IN PUB. HEALTH 401, 406–08 (2009) (claiming that ambiguous 
standards and procedures “result[] in an array of minimally compliant suicide prevention 
standards overall”). 
119 Id. at 407. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 408 (“Court proceedings had not provided any impetus to the jails to develop or 
augment their policies . . . [I]t would take many more years of ‘legalese.’”). 
122 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (establishing that punishments incompati-
ble with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” 
are violative of the Eighth Amendment). 
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First, there will likely be more difficult issues with proof.  Part 
I.B.1 addressed the risks posed to officials by suicide liability suits and 
cited the difficulties in proving deliberate indifference as a barrier to 
summary judgment, which heightens the risk of being required to 
provide full discovery and fully litigate the suit.  The risk is height-
ened compared to Section 1983 actions brought under other consti-
tutional provisions, which do not require proof of subjective intent.  
The degree of proof required for suicide liability suits compared to 
that required for actions brought by currently incarcerated persons 
challenging conditions of confinement or deprivation of medical 
care, is significantly reduced.  As discussed in Part I.A.1, in suicide li-
ability cases the plaintiff need not prove that an objectively serious 
harm occurred since the suicide itself is evidence of such harm.  Con-
versely, a currently incarcerated person filing a complaint regarding 
his or her treatment must plead and prove the objective prong of 
Farmer in addition to the subjective prong.  Since suicide precludes 
contestation of the first prong, such suits are by their nature less de-
manding.  This is further compounded by the fact that the evidence 
in suits challenging current treatment is often provided by the mis-
treated prisoner him or herself, thereby raising evidentiary and cred-
ibility concerns not present as extensively in suicide liability suits. 
Second, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which does not apply to 
suits brought by a deceased inmate’s estate, is likely to apply in full 
force here.123  The PLRA acts as a deterrent to suit.  It is going to limit 
the representation available to the inmate, since the collection of fees 
and costs is limited.  Plus, the scope of relief and damages is also lim-
ited, thus further reducing the incentive for attorneys to litigate such 
cases.  This is in stark contrast to suits brought under Section 1983 
that are not subject to the PLRA, in which there is asymmetrical fee 
shifting that favors plaintiff attorneys.  As a result, suits challenging 
isolation and restraints as methods of preventing suicide are less like-
ly to proceed than suits challenging inadequate precautions after an 
inmate suicide. 
Ultimately, suicides are expensive for prison officials.  Officials 
cannot contest the objective prong of the Farmer test; officials can ex-
pect a relatively substantial award of damages for death; there is no 
fee-capping statute for the plaintiff’s lawyers; and a jury is likely to be 
sympathetic to the deceased.  By contrast, suits challenging excessive 
precautions such as restraints and isolation are subject to PLRA fee 
caps, PLRA limitations on physical damages, and limitations on 
 
123 See supra Part III. 
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proof, and will likely experience juries unsympathetic to the plight of 
a restrained or isolated prisoner.  This uneven playing field makes it 
more difficult to strike a balance through tort law since the risks, and 
the magnitude of the risks, do not incentivize finding a middle 
ground. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS 
Tort law, including constitutional tort law, is critical to the proper 
functioning of our society.  It incentivizes individuals and entities to 
internalize externalities and act in a manner that addresses the rights 
of others.  Tort law also deters individuals and entities from acting in 
ways that create liability, thus deterring behavior society finds to be 
offensive or repulsive.  The goals of tort law are only realized when 
the risk and magnitude of liability are representative of the behavior 
society wishes to deter or incentivize and to the extent society intends 
to do so.124  But here, tort law has failed.125 
The consequences of the imperfections in our tort law are appar-
ent.  The cost of defending against suits asserting a failure to take ad-
equate precautions to prevent inmate suicide and the likelihood and 
magnitude of liability have led prison officials to ignore the science 
and, instead, employ archaic precautions.  Although liability for the 
inhumane conditions of confinement and a failure to provide medi-
cal care for serious mental conditions theoretically should be able to 
provide a backstop to such measures, they are not doing so success-
fully at this point in time.  In order to see the proper balance being 
achieved, we need an even playing field. 
The state of our current law suggests that inmate suicide should 
be prevented at any cost.  In addition to the perverse incentives this 
creates in the treatment of suicidal prisoners, it also has implications 
on one’s right to the control of one’s own body.  While the Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to establish a broad sweeping “right to die,” 
there is no legal prohibition on suicide.126  In fact, we as a society sen-
 
124 See Keating, supra note 15, at 684–86 (discussing various level of risk reduction). 
125 Reasonable minds differ in regards to cost-justification and constitutional torts.  For an 
argument that Eighth Amendment claims should not be defeated by notions of cost, see 
Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Health Care, Political Choice, and the Accidental Death Penalty, 11 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2008).  Ms. Alexander addresses traditional notions of cost, rather 
than the type of cost presented here—namely, the cost to the health and welfare of the 
prisoner imposed by the use of isolation and restraints.  The costs at issue here are argua-
bly more understandable and less controversial than the fiscal considerations most op-
pose. 
126 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (denying constitutional due process 
right to assisted suicide for not constituting a fundamental liberty interest). 
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tence convicted felons in our prisons to death and force their lives to 
be taken.127  In light of this, it seems contradictory to so rigorously 
prohibit determined prisoners from taking the identical action them-
selves. 
Several courts have addressed cases where prisoners sentenced to 
death refuse to appeal or contest their impending execution.128  The-
se courts have held that a failure to contest execution indicates that 
the inmate is not competent to be executed—we are fully prepared to 
execute prisoners only up until the point that they consent to the ex-
ecution and then the punishment is prohibited.  But it seems quite 
absurd to maintain that suicidal tendencies by a convicted prisoner 
preparing to face his own execution are indicia of incompetence. 
I make no suggestion that suicide ought to be permitted in our 
prison system.  I raise the aforementioned arguments in an attempt 
to suggest that even though tort balancing will likely see instances of 
suicide that would otherwise be prevented through extreme isolation 
and restraint, it is still preferable to the inhumane suicide prevention 
measures currently in effect.129 
The critical question that remains is how the outcome of suits al-
leging suicide liability and unconstitutional treatment can properly 
reflect the type of precautions that are truly cost-justified.  The most 
organic way for such a change to occur is through the use of Section 
1983 suits themselves.  Suits alleging unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement for the use of solitary confinement and those for depri-
vation of medical care for serious medical needs can be brought by 
prisoners who are severely restrained without mental health care.  
Imposing liability for actions that cross the line from treating to mis-
treating suicidal prisoners will incentivize officials to step back from 
extreme measures in order to avoid such liability.  The difficulties in-
herent in these suits as addressed in Part III, however, make this or-
ganic resolution largely aspirational. 
Since Section 1983 suits brought by currently incarcerated per-
sons are so difficult to mount, there may be a need for external inter-
vention.  There are two potential options for striking a balance that 
are particularly viable:  one requiring a long-sought decision by the 
 
127 See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting a mo-
tion to stay execution pending competency after a death row inmate became “a volun-
teer”). 
128 See generally Kristen M. Dama, Redefining A Final Act:  The Fourteenth Amendment and States’ 
Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be Put to Death, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1083 (2007). 
129 While such a proposition admittedly seems to undermine the value of human life, it is the 
same sacrifice we see pervasive in all areas of tort law free of strict liability. 
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Supreme Court and the other involving the administrative capabili-
ties of the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a subset of the Department of 
Justice. 
First, the Supreme Court could grant certiorari to correct the mis-
application130 of Section 1983 liability for prisoner suicide.  The cur-
rent Eighth Amendment standards of liability are entirely set by Su-
preme Court precedent.  The Court has not specifically considered 
the Eighth Amendment in the context of suicidal prisoners,131 despite 
the strong urging of many parties132 and the inordinately high suicide 
rate in our prisons and jails.133  The Supreme Court has established 
deliberate indifference as the standard for liability134 and has inter-
preted that standard to mean that the official was subjectively aware 
of the risk of serious harm, yet failed to take proper precautions to 
protect against it.135  The application of the deliberate indifference 
standard to the treatment of suicidal prisoners, however, remains an 
open question.136  The Court has recognized that depriving a physical-
ly ill prisoner of lifesaving treatment is sufficient to at least plead a 
claim of deliberate indifference.137  But this has not been uniformly 
expanded to encompass lifesaving mental health treatment for psy-
chologically ill prisoners. 
As a result, rather than providing treatment for mentally ill prison-
ers, officials are instituting severe practices of restraint and isola-
 
130 In this context, I define “misapplication” as the heightened level of liability imposed in 
suicide cases and the lower levels of liability in restraint and isolation cases. 
131 Reply Brief of Petitioner for Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Troyanos v. Coats, 132 S. 
Ct. 1560 (2012) (No. 11-742), 2012 WL 259400, at *1 (urging the Court to grant certiora-
ri because a Section 1983 suicide case has never been considered despite the high num-
ber of suicide cases in the circuits). 
132 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Appendix Volume I, Arocho v. Cnty. of 
Lehigh, 555 U.S. 815 (2008) (No. 07-1361), 2008 WL 1892739; Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari, Bradley v. Simpson, 547 U.S. 1018 (2005) (No. 05-754), 2005 WL 3392967; Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Smith v. Blue, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002) (No. 02-385), 2002 WL 
32134417; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McCrary v. Comstock, 537 U.S. 817 (2002) (No. 
01-1698), 2002 WL 32134047. 
133 NOONAN & GINDER, supra note 2, at Tables 2, 15. 
134 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
135 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S 825, 842 (1994) (“[I]t is enough that the official acted or 
failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”). 
136 Reply Brief of Petitioner for Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 131, at *1 (urging 
the Court to grant certiorari because a Section 1983 suicide case has never been consid-
ered despite the high number of suicide cases in the circuits). 
137 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007) (per curiam) (finding “[it] was error for 
the Court of Appeals to conclude that the allegations in question, concerning harm 
caused petitioner by the termination of his medication, were too conclusory” when the 
prisoner was removed from a hepatitis C treatment program). 
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tion.138  Whether such behavior—depriving the mentally ill of mental 
health treatment—qualifies as deliberate indifference is an applica-
tion of the Farmer standard the Court has not considered.  The Court 
need not decide whether prisoners are entitled to mental health care 
in order to ensure balance in the implementation of suicide precau-
tions.  The Court could either grant certiorari where the lower court 
decided whether an official was liable for the suicide of a prisoner or 
the Court could grant certiorari where the lower court decided 
whether an official was liable for excessively restraining a suicidal 
prisoner without providing mental health care.  The former would 
provide the Court an opportunity to make clear that imposing liabil-
ity for suicide requires that the official fail to take proper precautions, 
not that the prison official fail to take all physically possible precau-
tions.  The latter would afford the Court an opportunity to limit the 
extent to which the use of restraints can be constitutional.  It is im-
practical to expect, and would be even more impractical to issue, a 
perfectly clear opinion balancing those precautions which must be 
taken to prevent suicide and those precautions that are cruel and 
unusual.  But simply recognizing that some balance between the two is 
necessary would be an excellent first step toward recalibrating suicide 
prevention policies to provide protection and treatment rather than 
solely restraint and isolation. 
Second, the Bureau of Prisons as an administrative agency could 
promulgate regulations to govern the standards of treatment for sui-
cidal prisoners in federal prisons.  While such a regulation would not 
be binding on state prisons and local jails, tort law often relies on in-
dustry standards.  By providing a well-balanced policy for federal 
prisons, the Bureau of Prisons could set an industry standard for all 
to follow.  In a similar vein, the National Commission on Correctional 
Health Care (NCCHC) and139 the American Correctional Association 
(ACA) could update their standards to reflect modern understand-
ings of mental illness and suicide.140  While NCCHC and ACA stand-
 
138 See e.g., Arocho v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 922 A.2d 1010, 1011–14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 815 (2008) (explaining each level of suicide precaution, none of which 
provide treatment for the suicidal prisoner despite requiring “medical restraints”). 
139 Since the ACA standards are applied solely to jails, either both entities would need to 
promulgate similar standards or only the NCCHC. 
140 These standards currently require suicide prevention policies to provide for special hous-
ing, increased observation, and medical restraint.  The standards do not indicate to what 
extent restraints are appropriate and there is no recognition that, at a certain point, such 
restraints may be more harmful than helpful.  Furthermore, the standards do not provide 
any type of mental health or other medical services for those classified as suicidal.  AM. 
CORR. ASS’N, CORE JAIL STANDARDS (2010), available at http://www.aca.org/ACA_PROD_
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ards are not binding and likewise cannot absolve officials of liability, 
these standards provide easy-to-adopt guidelines that prisons and jails 
can use to reform current policies. 
Unlike a Supreme Court decision, which would likely create a 
generally applicable rule for deliberate indifference in cases involving 
suicidal prisoners, standard-setting entities could be more careful in 
constructing suicide prevention measures.  In this respect, specific 
standards may have more of an effect on the extent and utility of re-
forming suicide precautions.  Furthermore, the comparative ease 
with which such precautions can be amended as we develop a better 
understanding of mental illness and the treatment it requires is ap-
pealing.  Ultimately, without a decision from the Supreme Court or 
an Act of Congress, these standards will not be binding on correc-
tional institutions or its officials.  The standards will, however, set an 
industry standard by which the conduct of officials and institutions 
can be evaluated.  As a result, either a Supreme Court decision or an 
adept industry standard could have a great impact on finally striking 
the balance between treating and mistreating suicidal prisoners. 
CONCLUSION 
The pervasiveness of mental illness and the rates of suicide in our 
prison system are staggering.  But the treatment of these mentally ill 
and suicidal prisoners is even more alarming.  Physically restraining 
prisoners in painful positions for extended periods of time is effective 
in physically preventing suicide and therefore Eighth Amendment su-
icide liability.  The Eighth Amendment, however, also prohibits cruel 
and unusual punishment.  As a result, there must be a balance be-
tween the duty prison officials have to protect inmates from commit-
ting suicide and the extent to which officials can employ any method 
possible to prevent potential suicides. 
Tort law itself is intended to incentivize taking those precautions 
that are cost-justified.  The use of uncomfortable restraints for pro-
longed periods of time has its costs.  It costs suicidal and mentally ill 
prisoners more of their mental health and welfare.  It imposes costs 
that are not always justified by the results, in contravention of the 
guiding principle to tort liability.  While protecting prisoners from 
suicide is an important task, protecting prisoners from painful and 
stressful restraints is also vital. 
 
IMIS/Docs/Standards%20and%20Accreditation/CoreJailStandards.pdf;  NAT’L COMM’N 
ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN ADULT CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES (2008). 
Oct. 2014] WEIGHING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 285 
 
The unique success suicide liability suits have experienced has 
created an imbalance in the level of incentive provided by the risk of 
Section 1983 liability.  But by deterring the unjustified use of suicide 
prevention measures such as solitary confinement and severe re-
straints through Section 1983 liability, the Eighth Amendment can 
regain its balance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
